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Abstract
Machine learning models can leak information re-
garding the dataset they have trained. In this pa-
per, we present the first membership inference at-
tack against black-boxed object detection models
that determines whether the given data records are
used in the training. To attack the object detection
model, we devise a novel method named as called a
canvas method, in which predicted bounding boxes
are drawn on an empty image for the attack model
input. Based on the experiments, we successfully
reveal the membership status of privately sensitive
data trained using one-stage and two-stage detec-
tion models. We then propose defense strategies
and also conduct a transfer attack between the mod-
els and datasets. Our results show that object detec-
tion models are also vulnerable to inference attacks
like other models.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, deep neural networks have been
widely adopted in various computer vision tasks such as im-
age classification, object detection, and semantic segmenta-
tion. Many deep learning models in various fields have been
developed using a wide variety of data. These data often con-
tain privately sensitive information such as medical records,
personal photos, personal profiles, and financial information.
If designed without considering adversarial threats, the model
can leak sensitive information of the dataset it has trained.
In [Shokri et al., 2017], it was demonstrated that even with
black-box access, an adversary can conduct a membership in-
ference attack that determines whether a data record is a part
of the training set.
Early studies on membership inference attacks have fo-
cused on classification tasks [Ahmed et al., 2018]. Several
other adversarial attacks against the object detection model
have been studied, the results of which indicate the poten-
tial leakage of the model[Xie et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2018].
Through this study, we have begun extending the membership
inference attack to object detection tasks.
∗Contact Author
Datasets used in an object detection model can also be sub-
ject to privacy leaks. Examples of such data include outdoor
pedestrian data, photos with sensitive text, and video data for
autonomous driving. The membership inference of detection
models can be helpful to assess whether data are collected il-
legally for training purposes, and attack vulnerability can be
viewed as a gateway to further attacks.
Compared to classifiers, there are difficulties in attack de-
tection models: 1) In classification tasks, only the last logit of
the same size is regarded, whereas in object detection tasks,
all predictions based on the location of the objects are of con-
cern. 2) Object detection tasks may have multiple objects in a
single image, whereas a usual image classification task has a
single object. To address these issues, we propose the canvas
method for attacking an object detection model and tracing
the differences in the views among the trained and test data.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We first propose a new membership inference attack on
object detection models with black-box access. We de-
scribe the proposed canvas method, which draws a pre-
dicted bounding box distribution on an empty canvas for
convolutional neural network (CNN) classification net-
works. Using this method, we can achieve a higher per-
formance than conventional machine learning methods
on the PASCAL VOC dataset.
• We found experimentally that our attack method is ro-
bust to various types of object detection models. In ad-
dition, we showed that membership inference attacks are
also successful on privately sensitive data with seem-
ingly little difference between accuracy of the training
and test datasets. We also conducted a transfer attack
between different models and datasets.
• We suggest the use of defense methods applying a dif-
ferentially private algorithm. Experiment results show
that the differentially private (DP) algorithm can de-
fend against a membership inference with a calculated
amount of privacy loss.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Membership Inference Attack
The end of a membership inference attack is to determine
whether the given data record is in the training dataset of the
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target model. A membership inference attack is based upon
the assumption that the target model has a different view of
the training data than that of test data that was not seen before.
Although overfitting is considered to be a root cause of this
membership disclosure, it cannot be the only cause [Long et
al., 2018]. The attack model may have black-box and white-
box access to the target model. Under the white-box access
scenario, the attack model has access to certain versions of in-
put data or intermediate layers as well as trained parameters
of the target model. White-box knowledge is powerful but not
realistic because the target model may not provide detailed
information. In a black-box setting, the attacker does not
have direct access to the target model parameters. The attack
model can only access the input data and the model output
predictions. The attack model should identify the difference
between the inferred predictions of the training and test sam-
ples of the target model. To achieve this aim, shadow models
trained using the same algorithm are built on shadow datasets
sampled from a similar distribution as the target datasets but
do not contain the target training data. The attack model
queries the shadow model and learns to distinguish whether
the shadow model output comes from the training set.
Shokri et al. [2017] first presented the first membership in-
ference attack against machine learning models. Ahmed et al.
[2018] enhanced an attack by relaxing some of the assump-
tions. Hayes et al. [2019] describes a membership inference
attack against generative models. To mitigate the risk of a
membership inference, Rahman et al. [2018] and Nasr et al.
[2018] designed differentially private models and devised an
adversarial regularization, respectively.
2.2 Object Detection
Object detection is a widely used computer vision task that
deals with detecting an instance of a semantic objects in im-
ages or videos. There are mainly two types of methods for
object detection using deep learning, namely, one-stage and
two-stage detection.
One-Stage Detection One-stage detectors such as YOLO
[Redmon et al., 2016] or SSD [Liu et al., 2016] treat an object
detection problem as an end-to-end simple regression prob-
lem. The one-stage model directly predicts the class scores
and bounding box coordinates concurrently.
Two-Stage Detection A two-stage detection model such
as Faster R-CNN [Ren et al., 2015] is divided into two
stages. The model first generates region proposals by narrow-
ing down the number of possible object locations by filtering
out most of the background samples on a region proposal net-
work (RPN). The model then passes the proposals through
the CNN head to classify the labels and regress the bounding
boxes.
2.3 Datasets
PASCAL VOC Dataset (2007,2012) [Everingham et al.,
2010] PASCAL VOC datasets have been widely adopted
as benchmark datasets in basic object detection tasks. The
PASCAL VOC datasets consist of VOC2007 and VOC2012.
The datasets contain 20 object categories including people,
bicycles, birds, bottles, dogs, etc.
INRIA Pedestrian Dataset [Dalal and Triggs, 2005] The
INRIA Pedestrian dataset is popular for pedestrian detection,
which consists of 614 images for training and 288 images for
testing.
SynthText [Gupta et al., 2016] The SynthText dataset is
a synthetically generated text dataset in which several words
are placed in imgaes of natural scenes. The dataset consists of
approximately 800 thousand images and 8 million synthetic
word instances in various languages.
3 Attack Methodology
In this section, we propose a membership inference attack
for object detection models. An overview of the membership
inference attack is illustrated in Figure 1. The setting of our
membership inference attack is as followes:
Assumption We assume that the adversary has black-
box access to the target model. The adversary can obtain
final logit values but no other specific intermediate layer
weight information of the target models. For the given tar-
get object detection model ftarget and input image sample
xi the target model returns the proposed bounding boxes
bboxj = ((x
0
j , y
0
j ), (x
1
j , y
1
j )) and prediction scores sj , (j =
1, 2, ..., Nb) where (xj , yj) and Nb denote the corner of the
bounding box and the number of proposed boxes, respec-
tively. In addition, the adversary can set a score thresh-
old θscore and non-maximum suppression (NMS) thresholds(
θnms for one-stage, { θrpnnms, θheadnms } for two-stage detectors)
to customize the personal preference of the attacker. In ad-
dition, it is assumed that the target and shadow data do not
overlap, i.e., Dtrainshadow ∩Dtraintarget = ∅
3.1 Motivation
The basic idea of a membership inference attack is that the
model has a different view on the trained data and unseen
data. For a classification task, the model tends to achieve a
high prediction score on the training samples over the test
samples. Therefore, the attack model is able to classify the
membership status using the last posterior logit value of a
given sample. Similarly, as shown in Figure 2, the object de-
tection model tends to achieve consistent box predictions on
the training samples while showing an uncertainty regarding
the test samples.
3.2 Gradient Tree Boosting
Gradient tree boosting is a widely used classification al-
gorithm for numerous applications. Specifically, we use
XG-BOOST [Chen and Guestrin, 2016], a popular algo-
rithm applied feature classification, to distinguish whether
a given example is in the training sample. For the
predicted bounding box coordinates and prediction scores
(bboxj , sj), we concatenate them in a long 1-D vec-
tor: (x01, y
0
1 , x
1
1, y
1
1 , s1, ..., x
0
Nb
, y0Nb , x
1
Nb
, y1Nb , sNb), and pad
them with zero values to allow all vectors to have the same
length. Using these vectors, we proceed with the member-
ship classification using XG-BOOST.
Figure 1: Overview of membership inference attack on object detection model. The target and shadow datasets are sampled from the same
dataset space. The target model trains using its target dataset and the shadow model, which has a similar structure as the target model, trains
using its shadow dataset. The predicted values of the target and shadow models are expressed as bounding boxes and their prediction scores
along with their membership status labels (”in” for the training set ”out” for the test set). Finally, the attack model which trains using the
shadow model’s prediction and membership status, attacks the target model by passing the target records, and estimates their membership
status probabilities for each target example.
Figure 2: Predicted bounding boxes in training and test examples.
The first row shows the training examples and their predicted boxes.
Below are test examples and their predicted boxes.
3.3 Convolutional Neural Network Based Method
The next method applied to the attack model is CNN based
approach. An object detection task differs from a classifica-
tion because the model predicts 1) the box location informa-
tion and 2) the bulk of the bounding boxes, most of which
may be unhelpful. Therefore, we propose a new approach,
called the canvas Method, to adequately process a predicted
array for a CNN-based attack model.
Canvas Method In the object detection model, the model
extracts numerous candidate boxes. Even for only a single
object, the model predicts many predicted boxes. The NMS
algorithm used in an object detection task is designed to fil-
ter out messy boxes that are predicted for a single object and
predict them as a single proposed box. Using NMS, the box
with the highest score is first chosen and boxes that overlap
above the threshold are filtered out. To see the clear distribu-
tion of predicted boxes before the NMS, the threshold of the
NMS is set to be a high value during the prediction. Because
Figure 3: Examples of bounding box drawn canvas images using the
proposed canvas method. The first row is the training data and the
second and third-row images are the test data.
the detection model shows a different positional variance in
predicting the training and test samples, this location informa-
tion is important in a CNN-based attack model. In addition,
similar to a classification model, the model also shows a high
prediction score in the trained samples, which is crucial to a
membership inference.
To facilitate this information, we propose the use of the
canvas method, which draws a predicted bounding box dis-
tribution on an empty canvas for a CNN classification net-
work. The canvas is initially set to an image of 300×300
pixels in size, where every pixel has a value of zero and the
boxes drawn on the canvas have the same center as the pre-
dicted boxes and the same intensity as the prediction scores.
Regarding the size of the boxes drawn on the canvas, we ap-
plied two design approaches. The first one is drawing a box
equal in size as the predicted box, and the other is to draw all
boxes with an identical size on the canvas regardless of the
original size of the predicted box. We call the first approach
the original box size, and the second the uniform box size.
We use the uniform box size to make objects of all sizes de-
tected achieve the same effect on the canvas. We set the size
of a uniform box at 10% of the canvas size. Figure 3 shows
the examples of the canvas methods.
Augmentation Because a bounding box distribution in a
canvas image should be robust to rotations and flipping, we
adopt rotation and flipping when training the attack model.
We do not apply other augmentation methods such as random
cropping or perspective transformation because these aug-
mentations generate transformed bounding box distribution
which might distract the target model’s view on the training
or test samples.
Score Rescaling The prediction score of the detection
model’s predicted bounding box refers to how confident the
model is with the objectness of bounding boxes. Because the
score values are calculated after the softmax layer, the values
are between zero and one. With the canvas method, bounding
boxes are drawn on the canvas at the same intensity as the
prediction score, and the confidence of the model might not
be fully represented. For example, if the model predicts two
bounding boxes with scores of 0.9 and 0.9999 respectively, it
indicates that the model is much more certain that the latter
is an object. However, these values do not themselves rep-
resent a significant difference on the canvas. To emphasize
the model’s prediction scores of the model, we utilize a score
rescaling function.
srescale = − log(1− s) (1)
In a Taylor expansion, this function is represented as
−log(1 − s) = s + s22 + s
3
3 + .... Therefore in the case
of an extremely small s, a rescale function is an approximate
identity function, which means the rescaling has little effect
on small scores. Using this function, the minuscule difference
between the two scores (i.e. 0.0999 from 0.9 and 0.9999) is
changed to 6.91 (from 2.30 and 9.21), which can be seen as
significant.
3.4 Transfer Attack
We mitigate the assumption that the distribution of the target
training data is similar to that of the shadow training data.
In a realistic situation, it could be difficult or even impossi-
ble to secure a sufficient number of shadow data having the
same distribution as the target data. Under this scenario, in
[Ahmed et al., 2018], a transfer attack was proposed, which
composes a shadow model with relatively common and sim-
ilar object detection dataset. Although a shadow model has
difficulty mimicking the target model’s behavior owing to dif-
ferent statistics and appearances between two data distribu-
tions, the attack model is still expected to be able to capture
the membership status of the given data.
On the other hand, the target model structure may be dif-
ferent. We also conducted another style of transfer attack,
the shadow model structure of which differs from that of the
target model.
4 Defense
To mitigate a membership inference against machine learning
models, we propose several defense techniques.
4.1 Dropout
Because overfitting is a dominant reason why the target mod-
els leak their training data information, generalization tech-
niques that prevent overfitting can help defend models against
membership inferences. We adopt Dropout [Srivastava et al.,
2014], to obtain a well-generalized model.
4.2 Differentially Private Algorithm
Differential privacy [Dwork, 2011] offers a strong standard
of privacy guarantees for computations involving aggregate
datasets. It requires that any change to a single data point
should reveal statistically indistinguishable differences from
the model’s output. A formal definition of differential privacy
is described below:
Definition 1 ((, δ) - Differential Privacy).
Given two neighboring datasets D and D′, differing by
only one record, a randomized mechanism A provides (, δ)
- Differential Privacy if for ∀S ⊆ Range(A) ,
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ (2)
We call this (, δ)-DP for short. If δ = 0 , A provides a
stricter -DP.  is called a privacy loss. To create a differ-
entially private deep learning model, a differentially private
stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [Abadi et al., 2016;
McMahan et al., 2017; Song et al., 2013] is adopted to op-
timize the model. Compared to a conventional SGD opti-
mizer, DP-SGD optimizer has two main changes to achieve
the required privacy guarantee: adding Gaussian noise to gra-
dient and gradient clipping for each minibatch sample. The
specific algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. Abadi el
al. [2016] showed a way to track a tight differential privacy
bound of DP-SGD using moments accountant (MA). Accord-
ing to Yu et al. [2019], however, MA assumes random sam-
pling with replacement which is impractical and is outper-
formed by random reshuffling [Gu¨rbu¨zbalaban et al., 2015].
Assuming sampling batches by random reshuffling, Yu et al.
[2019] showed that realistic privacy loss bound for DP-SGD
is (ρ+
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP for ρ = k2σ2 where σ is noise scale
and k is the number of epochs.
5 Experiments
In this section, we describe the application of our method to
several object detection tasks. To reduce confusion, we call
the training dataset and test dataset of target and shadow mod-
els ”in” and ”out” data respectively. We used the Chainer
framework for the object detection modules and Pytorch for
the membership attack modules.
5.1 Target and Shadow Model Setup
Models To build target models, we train several object
detection models including SSD and Faster R-CNN. For
one-stage detection, the base SSD300-VGG16 and SSD512-
VGG16 models use the VGG16 network as a backbone and
have 300×300 images and 512×512 images as the inputs,
respectively. The SSD300-Res50 model uses ResNet50 net-
work as a backbone. For two-stage detection, the Faster R-
CNN model uses the VGG16 network as a backbone and re-
ceives images with a scale of between 600 and 800.
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private SGD
Input: Training examples {x1, . . . , xN}, loss function
L(θ) = 1
N
ΣiL(θ, xi), learning rate ηt, group size L,
noise scale σt gradient norm bound C
1 Initialize θ0 randomly ;
2 for t = 1 : T do
3 data batching:
4 Take a random batch of data samples Bt from the training
dataset;
5 B = |Bt|;
6 Compute gradient:
7 For each i ∈ Bt, gt(xi)←5θtL(θt, xi);
8 Clip gradient:
9 gˆt(xi)← gt(xi)/max
(
1, ||gt(xi)||2
C
)
;
10 Add noise:
11 g˜t ← 1B
(∑
i gˆt(xi) +N (0, σ2tC2I)
)
;
12 Descent:
13 θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜t ;
14 end
15 Output : θT ;
Datasets During the experiments, we used the datasets
described earlier, i.e., VOC dataset, INRIA Pedestrian
Dataset, and SynthText. According to Ahmed et al.
[2018], one shadow dataset is sufficient. For each
dataset, D=(Dtrain, Dtest), we split them by half into
(Dintarget, D
out
target) and (D
in
shadow, D
out
shadow) to separate the
target and shadow datasets. For SynthText dataset, we use the
first 5,000 images with Latin characters for the target dataset
and next 5,000 images for the shadow dataset.
Training To train the SSD model, we used an SGD op-
timizer with an initial learning rate 10−3, 0.9 momentum,
0.0005 weight decay and batch size 8. We trained the model
500k iterations and dropped the learning rate by 0.1 in the
200kth, 400kth iterations. During training, we used data aug-
mentation including horizontal flipping, color distortion, ran-
dom expansion and cropping. To compare the effect of the
augmentation, we also trained models that only applied flip-
ping. To train the Faster R-CNN model, we used the same
optimizer and learning rate as in the SSD and batch size 1.
Prediction In the case of a one-stage model, to see the over-
all distribution of the predicted bounding boxes, NMS thresh-
old was set to 1.0. In the case of a two-stage model with two
NMS layers, the RPN-NMS and the head-NMS thresholds
were set to 0.7 and 1.0 respectively, because the high thresh-
old value of RPN-NMS can cause a huge number of box pro-
posals. The score threshold was set to 0.01.
5.2 Attack Model Setup
To perform a black-box membership inference attack, we
built several attack models as presented above. For XG-Boost
model, we used Python XG-Boost package1. XG-Boost clas-
sifier takes vectorized bounding boxes and scores as inputs
and has 5 maximum depth of a tree and 450 estimators as
model parameters. For CNN-based classifiers with canvas
1https://github.com/dmlc/xgboost
Attack Attack Method SSD FR
Model Aug BT SR Acc AR Acc AR
XGB 66.09 67.64 60.47 60.48
shallow (O) 62.62 62.66 58.72 58.67
AlexNet (O) 64.28 64.26 62.74 62.62
AlexNet X (O) 67.55 67.55 64.30 64.22
AlexNet X (O) X 68.30 68.24 66.59 66.49
AlexNet X (U) 69.34 69.31 66.69 66.59
AlexNet X (U) X 71.07 71.02 67.42 67.34
Table 1: Comparison of various attack methods. FR and XGB de-
note Faster R-CNN and XG-Boost. Aug, BT, SR and AR denote
augmentation, box style of canvas method, score rescaling and av-
erage recall, respectively. (O) and (U) denote original and uniform
box size, respectively.
Figure 4: Membership inference attack results on various target
models.
method, we built two CNN models, a simple shallow CNN
model and AlexNet [Krizhevsky et al., 2012]. For Shallow
CNN model, we used two convolutional networks having 64
and 128 channels and two fully connected networks having
128 and 2 units. CNN based attack model takes drawn canvas
images with predicted boxes as input. For balanced training,
the attack model uses the almost same number of predicted
results of ”in” data and ”out” data of the shadow model. We
applied vertical and horizontal flipping for augmentation and
score rescaling presented above. We compared various can-
vas methods to find the most optimal attack model.
5.3 Experiment Results
Table 1 depicts the results of the comparisons of various at-
tack methods. In general, AlexNet with augmentation, score
rescaling and the uniform canvas method is successful on
both the SSD and Faster R-CNN models. Therefore, we
adopted the best performing method as the attack method in
the next experiments.
To demonstrate the relationship between the membership
inference and overfitting, we conducted experiments using
different numbers of iterations in the model. Figure 4 shows
that the overall attack performance increases with an in-
creases in the number of iterations.
Table 2 shows the results of the membership inference at-
tacks of various object detection models and datasets. The
attack model is the best performing model in table 1. The
mAP scores of the detection models are slightly smaller than
their original performance because they train only half of the
dataset. The evaluation metrics for the attack model are the
accuracy and average recall of ”in” and ”out” labels. The at-
tack model achieves a similar attack performance against the
target and shadow models because the distributions of dataset
Target Model Attack Model
Model Dataset iters test mAP train mAP Attack Acc Average Recall Val Acc
SSD300-VGG16(Little Aug.) VOC 400k 59.27 92.27 89.92 89.90 91.16
SSD300-VGG16 VOC 250k 73.88 89.30 67.88 67.92 72.20
SSD300-VGG16 VOC 500k 74.25 90.27 71.07 71.02 72.20
SSD512-VGG16 VOC 500k 76.53 91.09 71.03 70.10 73.04
SSD300-Res50 VOC 700k 66.04 85.43 73.86 73.82 75.97
Faster R-CNN VOC 200k 72.71 88.00 62.50 62.44 64.44
Faster R-CNN VOC 400k 71.80 90.20 67.42 67.34 64.44
SSD300-VGG16 INRIA 100k 88.20 90.90 71.40 62.95 73.21
SSD300-VGG16 SynthText 400k 88.45 90.84 66.90 66.90 68.49
Table 2: Attack performance on various models and datasets. Little Aug. refers training with only horizontal flipping. Attack Acc and
Average recall refer attack accuracy and average recall on target models. Val Acc refers attack accuracy on shadow models.
Model SSD300 SSD512 FR
SSD300 74.25 68.84 61.73
SSD512 66.87 71.03 62.94
FR 60.19 57.28 67.42
Dataset VOC INRIA SynthText
VOC 74.25 68.36 48.72
INRIA 74.28 71.40 50.85
SynthText 53.92 51.91 66.90
Table 3: Results of transfer attack over various object detection mod-
els and datasets. The x-axis represents the structure and dataset of
the target models attacked and the y-axis represents that of shadow
models for transfer attacks respectively. FR denotes Faster R-CNN.
and model structure are similar. Overall, the attack models
achieve a high accuracy for most detection of the models and
datasets. In general, large generalized errors are related to the
high performance of the attack models. In the case of target
models trained using the INRIA and SynthText datasets, test
mAP is relatively high because the tasks are easy, although
the attack models still obtain a high attack accuracy.
5.4 Transfer Attacks
Setup During the transfer attack, we used the same setup
as mentioned in Section 5.3. We conducted a transfer attack
over the SSD300, SSD512 and Faster R-CNN models and
VOC dataset. We also conducted transfer attacks over VOC,
INRIA, and SynthText datasets and SSD300 model.
Results Tables 3 list the results of the model and dataset
transfer attacks. The attack model trained using the same
model structure or distribution dataset showed the highest ac-
curacy. Transfer attacks on different detection models seemed
to work well. The usage of the VOC dataset to attack the
INRIA dataset and vice versa achieved a good performance.
This might be because these two datasets have the same
common label(”person”) and had a few objects per image.
However, a transfer attack between SynthText and the other
datasets did not perform well. This could be because Syn-
thText had little in common with VOC and INRIA and had
many objects per image. Transfer attacks tend to be success-
ful when the datasets or models are similar to each other.
Defense test mAP train mAP A-acc. p-loss
Base 74.25 90.27 71.07 ∞
Dropout 74.20 89.84 70.94 ∞
DP(σ=10−4) 74.32 88.15 68.68 2.42× 1010
DP(σ=10−3) 67.30 78.45 50.45 3.87× 108
Table 4: Comparison of various defense methods. A-acc and p-loss
denote the attack model accuracy and privacy loss respectively.
5.5 Defense
Setup We tested the proposed defense methods against
membership attacks. For the dropout, we added two dropout
layers with a ratio of 0.5 before the two layers of the model.
For the differentially private algorithm, we set noise scale
σ=10−3 , 10−4, gradient bound C = 50, and minibatch size
2. We set up a relatively small noise because the object detec-
tion model has a large number of parameters [McMahan and
Andrew, 2018].We trained the SSD300 model 800k iterations
for σ=10−3, and 500k iterations for the others. We obtained
the privacy loss with fixed δ=10−5.
Results Table 4 shows the results of the defense methods.
Dropout shows a slight drop in the attack accuracy, but it
does not show a large difference. The DP(σ=10−4) shows
little difference from the original model with mAP, but it
lowers attack accuracy meaningfully. The larger noise scale
DP(σ=10−3) shows some loss in accuracy, but its good de-
fense against the attack model compensates for this.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we introduced new membership inference at-
tacks against object detection models. Our proposed CNN-
based attack model using the canvas method performed bet-
ter than a traditional machine learning regression method. We
showed that sufficiently overfitted object detection models are
vulnerable to privacy leakage. A generalization error is not a
guarantee of safety against an inference attack. Transfer at-
tacks are also efficient when the models or datasets are simi-
lar. To mitigate the privacy risks, we proposed defense mech-
anisms that are able to reduce such risks. We showed that
membership inference risks in object detection models need
to be considered.
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